Abstract
Introduction

South Africa has been a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ('ICC
18 North-Gauteng High Court decision, ibid. The chapeau of sec. 5 of the DIPA refers to 'Immunities and privileges of United Nations, specialised agencies and other international organisations'. Sec. 5(3) in turn determines that: 'Any organisation recognised by the Minister for the purposes of this section and any official of such organisation enjoy such privileges and immunities as may be provided for in any agreement entered into with such organisation or as may be conferred on them by virtue of sec 7 (2).' This latter section determines that: 'The Minister may in any particular case if it is not expedient to enter into an agreement [conferring privileges and immunities] as contemplated in sub-sec (1) and if the conferment of immunities and privileges is in the interest of the Republic, confer such immunities and privileges on a person or organisation as may be specified by notice in the Gazette'. The text of the DIPA is available online at http://www.gov.za/documents/diplomatic-immunities-and-privileges-act (visited on 30 July 2015 The subsequent analysis will assess whether the North-Gauteng High Court came to the right conclusion, both in terms of the applicable international and domestic law. As will be illustrated below, the international law assessment turns on one's interpretation of the interrelationship between Articles 27(2) and 98( context is that the Constitutional Court confirmed that (the rights and obligations contained in) a treaty enacted into law will have the same status in domestic law as the act through which it was incorporated. 94 This implies that enacted treaties do not merely rank below the Constitution, the supreme law of South Africa, but can also rank below a parliamentary act -depending on the manner of its incorporation. 95 While a treaty enacted into law by an act of parliament will enjoy the same status as other parliamentary acts, a treaty enacted into law through subordinate legislation (for example, a ministerial proclamation in the Government Gazette), will be on par with other subordinate legislation. 96 This in turn confirms that it is the specific act of incorporation that determines the status of the rights and obligations stemming from the international agreement and not the parliamentary legislation that delegates the power of incorporation to the minister in question.
97
The subordinate status of legislative activity of the executive is an important component of the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive and of the checks and balances necessary to prevent the executive branch from usurping the power of the legislature. 98 Nevertheless, the social and political realities of the modern state make it inevitable that the legislature delegates the power to adopt legislation on specific issues to the executive. 99 Due to the complexities of modern governance, legislatures are not in a position to foresee all the situations that need to be regulated in a particular area. Therefore, primary legislation often is articulated in general terms, while empowering high ranking members of the executive to enact secondary, detailed regulation. 100 At the same time however, parliamentary (and judicial) control is crucial to ensure that legislative decisions by the executive remain within the limits of the delegated powers, in order to prevent a usurpation of powers by the executive. Chamber II in the domestic law is concerned, a clear doctrine still has to emerge. 109 In the one previous instance where the courts were confronted with the implementation of a binding international judicial decision in South Africa, they relied on the common law to give effect to the decision as there is not yet any adequate statutory framework in place. 110 As far as the immunities of the OAU Convention referred to in the host state agreement are concerned, the North-Gauteng High Court was also correct in concluding that their status in domestic legislation was that of secondary legislation. 113 Therefore, any conflict between these immunities and Article 10(9) of the Implementation Act necessarily means that the latter would prevail and that South Africa would not be relieved of its obligation to arrest and surrender Al Bashir when attending the AU summit. 114 There was some disagreement between the government and the North-Gauteng High Court as to whether the delegates covered by the immunity foreseen in the host-state agreement included all attendees, i.e. also state delegates, as opposed to only functionaries of the AU and inter-governmental organizations. 115 However, even if one were to agree that the immunity covered all attendees of the summit, it does not change the fact that the immunity merely possesses the status of subordinate legislation in the Republic. Anything else would violate the separation of powers by allowing the executive to set aside parliamentary legislation. Chamber reminded the country that arguments very similar to those presented by South Africa were rejected by the ICC when forwarded by the DRC the year before. As far as the ICC was concerned, there was no doubt that South Africa had to arrest and surrender Al Bashir and as there was no further issue that was unclear, there could not be any further the DIPA, supra note 18. The Minister however relied on section of this act. Be that as it may, regardless of whether one relies on the delegated powers in sec. 5 or sec. 6, the result remains the same. It is further not clear why he relies on the Quagliani case, supra note 78, § 37 as authority of his argument. It does not address the differences in status between international obligations introduced via primary and secondary legislation, respectively. 117 Al Bashir (South Africa) decision, supra note 5, § 3. 118 Ibid., § 4.
Statute by both withdrawing from the ICC Statute as provided for in its Article 127 and requesting parliament itself to suspend the Implementation Act. At this point in time South Africa is still a party to the ICC Statute and the Implementation Act is still in force in the Republic. As long as this is the case, the government is bound to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir when entering the country.
In the view of this author, the North-Gauteng High Court correctly determined that Al Bashir's immunity under customary law and the host-state agreement was lifted and that South Africa had to arrest and surrender him to the ICC. However, the reasoning of the court 125 In addition, the North-Gauteng High Court held that the appeal did not have reasonable prospects of success, as it was unlikely that another court would come to a different conclusion. 126 The government can however still seek leave to appeal directly with the Supreme Court of Appeal and are likely to attempt this in the near future. The matter will therefore occupy the South African judiciary and society for some time to come.
